



**UNIVERSITY STUDENTS' PERCEPTION ON THE
INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL ECONOMIC STATUS ON
VULNERABILITY TO RADICALIZATION IN KENYA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELLING**

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ABSTRACT

Purpose of Study: This research aimed to investigate university students' perceptions of the influence of family socioeconomic status on vulnerability to radicalization in Kenya and its implications for counseling interventions.

Statement of Problem: Radicalization and recruitment into violent extremist groups have become significant threats in Kenya and globally. University students are particularly vulnerable due to their developmental stage of identity exploration, which can be exacerbated by socioeconomic challenges.

Methodology: The study adopted a mixed-methods design targeting students, counselors, and peer counselors from two purposively selected public universities in Kenya. A sample of 644 respondents was determined using Yamane's formula, and data were collected via questionnaires, interviews, and focus groups. Analysis utilized chi-square tests with SPSS version 23.0 and NVivo 12, achieving instrument reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 0.79).

Result: The study found a strong and significant influence of family socioeconomic status on vulnerability to radicalization. The chi-square test of independence ($\chi^2 (16) = 74.836, p < 0.05$) revealed a significant association between family income levels and students' perception of vulnerability to radicalization, with Cramer's V = 0.471 indicating a strong effect size.

Conclusion: The study concluded that family socioeconomic status significantly affects students' vulnerability to radicalization. Addressing this issue requires targeted counseling interventions to reduce susceptibility to extremist ideologies.

Recommendation: The study recommends implementing well-designed, family-focused counseling programs to decrease vulnerability to radicalization and enhance efforts to counter violent extremism

Keywords: *Student's perception, influence of social economic status, vulnerability to radicalization, implications for counselling*

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) defines radicalization as the act of advocating, engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives (USAID 2011), hence allowing radicalization to comprise both the expression of extreme views and the actual exercise of violence. Radicalization is also considered to occur when an individual starts to develop political or religious ideas that are so fundamentally at odds with the upbringing environment or mainstream expectations of that community (Sikkens *et al.*, 2018). There are push factors that make it conducive to violent extremism and these include: lack of socio-economic opportunities; marginalization and discrimination; Economic and social circumstances and growing inequalities are one of the consistently cited drivers of radicalization. Unemployment or poverty alone is not the only push factor: perceptions of injustice, human-rights violations, social-political exclusion, widespread corruption or sustained mistreatment of certain groups, are also considered important push factors. When all these inequalities come together for a particular group, radical movements and violence are more likely to erupt (United Nations Development Programme, 2017)

The lack of socio-economic opportunities may take many different forms. One of the key unequivocal findings of the UNDP Report of 2017 was that economic factors can be significant drivers, with economic exclusion, unemployment and limited opportunities for upward mobility leading to alienation or frustration, which can result in radicalization leading to violent extremism (UNDP, 2017). Sustainable Development Goal 8 established by United Nations General Assembly in 2015 calls for the promotion of sustained and inclusive economic growth. High numbers of educated, frustrated young individuals without jobs is an issue in many developing countries including Kenya, and may fuel grievances together with feelings of disenfranchisement. Young individuals not engaged in meaningful employment, are more likely to engage in radicalization and violent extremism (Marke, 2007). This argument is supportive of the position adopted by Ikejiaku (2009) who argued that when youths can no longer cope with their lack of basic needs, they display a higher tendency to react by engaging in violent extremist behaviour (Ikejiaki, 2009). Indeed, statistical data suggests the existence of a strong correlation between violence and income inequality (Dixon, 2009). Unemployment provides a fertile ground for recruitment by violent extremist organizations since they can provide a route out of poverty with economic opportunities that are not readily available

through more legitimate means. Finances paid can act as an attractive inducement to uneducated, unskilled, rural and unemployed men and women to join extremist groups (UNDP, 2016).

Lack of educational or employment opportunities are not the only factors at play or that are always present that make individuals vulnerable to radicalization. A number of the most high-profile terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by highly educated graduates of university degree programs or those with advanced or professional training (USAID, 2011)

Kimari and Wakesho (2017) report that the United States of America and other countries have adopted a 'softer' approach to terrorism and violent extremism, termed as countering violent extremism (CVE). The Danish Government has also recommended that the 'softer' approach that emphasizes the need to address the drivers (push and pull factors) that lead young people to be radicalized, addresses the root of the problem more effectively than security-oriented/military approaches. Kimari and Wakesho (2017) further point out that within the United Nations (UN) there has also been a push for CVE to address terrorism and violent extremism. Regionally, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) developed a CVE strategy and established the IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE) program on strengthening resilience to violent extremism in Africa.

Terrorism remains a continuing challenge in Kenya, as a result the government has acknowledged the need to embrace a prevention approach as part of its response to this problem. This preventive approach recognizes the need for better engagement between communities and the police, the need to promote alternative preventive measures and find means of diverting young people away from the paths of violent extremism. It follows that preventing radicalization is important in countering violent extremism. Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE), launched by the President in September 2016, also articulates a clear vision of minimizing and eliminating violent extremism by mobilizing individuals and groups at the national and community levels to reject violent extremist ideologies, in order to minimize individuals whom terrorist groups can radicalize and recruit. This vision is consistent with global policy on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), in particular, the UN Security Council's Resolution 2178 (2014), whose focus is preventing radicalization, recruitment and mobilization of individuals into terrorist groups and is anchored on United Nations Plan of Action to prevent and counter violent extremism launched in 2016 (Ogada, 2017).

Governments and institutions often rely on surveillance, sanctions, and punitive measures to detect and counter radicalization within educational institutions, as observed by Figueiras and Ipince (2018). However, long-term interventions, such as counseling, are more sustainable in addressing youth vulnerability. Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) complements earlier security-focused counterterrorism laws, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012) and the Security Laws (Amendment) Act (2014), by incorporating preventive measures like employment, business opportunities, and life skills development. Despite progress, research gaps remain, particularly on the role of family socioeconomic status in radicalization, as noted by Ogada (2017) and the Ran Research Paper (2016). Youth, especially university students, are particularly vulnerable due to socio-economic challenges and demographic growth, making targeted counseling essential to mitigate the risks of radicalization, as highlighted by Cachalia et al. (2016) and Bhui et al. (2014).

Statement of the Problem

As a response to ever growing radicalization psychological research is beginning to examine how identity formation can become maladaptive and whether certain cognitive propensities can combine to create a mindset that presents a higher risk of the individual being vulnerable to radicalization. The family during this time is key as the child develops and the parent's social economic status plays a role in the socialization process of the individual. The government has put in place counter-terrorism strategies by the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and Anti-Terrorism Police Unit. Learning institutions have also improved their security systems and surveillance as they seek to counter terror activities. The National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) was also adopted by the 47 counties through customized County Action Plans (CAPs). Both NSCVE and CAPS are dependent on collaboration between the national government, civil society organizations, local communities, development partners and county governments for their success. However, despite these measures, radicalization still continues to escalate. These security-oriented interventions such as Counter Terrorism are short term in countering radicalization, the concern therefore is the provision of long-term interventions that would involve counselling individuals who are vulnerable to induce resilience, self-control and behavioral change, through training, education and psychological assistance. Counselling interventions that involve parents and giving knowledge about the impact of economic deprivation on the family and if it acts as a major pull factor towards violent extremism and vulnerability to radicalization is important. By improving contact between parent and child, the

parent may be able to influence and guide the child on dangers of radical groups. A stable home base to return to and stable social economic status can counter radicalization. Previous studies have indicated the key factors needed in countering terrorism but there is a need to use counselling as a long-term preventive solution to extremist views and establish resilience among populations that could be vulnerable. The study investigated university students' perceptions on the influence of social economic status on vulnerability to radicalization in Kenya.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to determine university students' perception on the influence of the family social economic status on vulnerability to radicalization in Kenya and implications for counselling.

Research Hypotheses

Ho1: There is no statistically significant association between university students' perception on the influence of social economic status and vulnerability to radicalization.

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Conger, Ge, Elder, Lorenz and Simons (1994) low socioeconomic status is described as a high level of economic pressure in which the family cannot meet its material needs, often falling behind in paying its debts and has to cut back on everyday expenses in an attempt to live within available means. Silke (2008) further defines low social-economic status as entailing poverty, poor housing in unhealthy surroundings, health problems, and an insecure future. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) argue that economic circumstances may be significant in the sense that it is the more prosperous citizens of poor countries who are attracted to terrorism. Research by Fair and Shepherd (2006) into the effects of prosperity upon the populations of 14 African and South Asian countries with a Muslim majority or a large Muslim minority also failed to find evidence of poverty as a factor that incites people to terrorism.

According to Kavanagh (2011) in a flourishing economy, highly educated individuals have attractive alternative options other than participation in militant activities and are more likely to refrain from those activities. This makes it more difficult for terrorist groups to select and enlist highly educated members. A study in Palestinian found that suicide bombers tended to be less poor than the population as a whole. In research among Palestinian suicide terrorists, favorable economic conditions led to less recruitment of better educated individuals (Benmelech, Berrebi & Klor, 2012) supporting the findings of Kavanagh (2011) mentioned. A survey by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) of 129 nations that had produced internationally

active terrorists, established that higher participation in terrorism is most closely associated with a lack of democracy or civil liberty at home and that there is little correlation with average national income. Thus, the economic position cannot be regarded as a causal factor of all radicalism and terrorism and there is little correlation with average national income in this study. This finding also suggests that an important characteristic of most democratic countries (i.e., having civil liberties) makes them less susceptible to terrorism than countries lacking this characteristic.

According to Onuoha (2014), unemployment and poverty are socio-economic challenges that are not only intricately interconnected but glaringly manifested in Northern Nigeria. The Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicated that unemployment rate in the country averaged 14.6 percent between 2006 and 2011, reaching an all-time high of 23.90 percent in December 2011. This came against favorable economic growth that was witnessed in the country in the same period. The NBS statistics further showed that millions of Nigerians lived in absolute poverty (Ojo, 2013; Vanguard, 2013). It is important to note that the youths are the worst hit by unemployment and poverty. The twin problem of unemployment and poverty overstretch the moral and psychological strength of many Nigerians to remain law-abiding citizens. As a result, most young people have taken crime as a survival strategy or are easily recruited into violent criminal or terrorist groups.

Onuoha (2014) further asserts that people in Northern Nigeria remain marginalized in terms of economic opportunities and, therefore, are highly vulnerable to behaviors unfavorable to peace and security. Given the dire socio-economic situation, they seem not to have anything at stake with the government. The future of the jobless youth and street urchins appears bleak which disposes them to be used to cause social disruptions, religious conflicts and violent extremism. Furthermore, Onuoha (2012) observes that unemployment and poverty are not direct causative factors of youth radicalization, but destitution, privation, hopelessness and other frustrating conditions. These make youths to be highly vulnerable to manipulation by extremist ideologues. As Komolafe (2012) argued, unemployment and poverty may not be the main factors in radicalization, but mass misery may be the epicenter of violent extremism. Youths may engage in violent acts in order to access basic needs and services such as food, education, health care, housing and sanitation (Komolafe, 2012). Also, the lives of the poor and unemployed are usually characterized by uncertainty which extremist group prey on in advancing their agenda.

The youthful population in East Africa, one of the youngest globally, significantly influences regional security, with projections indicating rapid growth. In Kenya, where 70% of

the population is under 30, challenges such as feeding, housing, educating, and planning for future generations persist. Botha and Abdile (2006) highlight that youths in the region are more vulnerable to conflict and political violence than older generations, making them more susceptible to radicalization. Cachalia et al. (2016) emphasize that educated yet frustrated youth lacking opportunities often face disillusionment, leading to declining trust in state institutions. Extremist groups exploit this hopelessness, offering a sense of purpose through seemingly noble causes. Socioeconomic factors thus play a critical role in driving youth toward radicalization.

Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on two theories the theory of psychosocial development and the cognitive dissonance theory. The fifth stage of Erik Erikson's theory of psychosocial development (1968) posits that it is a stage of identity versus role confusion and is a stormy and crucial period in an individual's life. During this stage, individuals search for a sense of self and personal identity, through an intense exploration of personal values, beliefs, and goals. Identity is attained at the fifth stage of psychosocial development as there is transition from childhood to adulthood. Independence can be acquired and exploration into the future in terms of career paths and social relationships can be attained by individuals. Erikson (1968) placed a particular emphasis on the development of ego identity. Ego identity is the conscious sense of self that we develop through social interaction and becomes a central focus during the identity versus confusion stage of psychosocial development. According to Erikson, our ego identity constantly changes due to new experiences and information we acquire in our daily interactions with others. As we have new experiences, we also take on challenges that can help or hinder the development of identity.

University students are still in this stage and want to belong and fit in the society. Failure to achieve this leads to role confusion where individuals get confused and helpless hence their hopes are crushed creating feeling of resentment and disillusionment. This may further result in maladaptive antisocial behavior thus making them vulnerable to radicalization. Healthy development is composed of points where an individual's intellectual, emotional, and social development forces him or her to make an essential, usually unconscious, choice about how his or her personality will develop. The main conflict in this stage is the contest between the formation of a strong identity or role confusion, the family during this stage plays a key role in the healthy psychological development of the individual. Erikson (1968) further suggests that young people reach a stage where ideologies assist in identity formation. If a young adult lacks

self-esteem, for example due to excessively controlling parents, joining a terrorist group might function as a strong “identity stabilizer,” providing the young adult with a sense of belonging, worth, and purpose.

This theory does not focus much on the cognitive processes like perceptions, inferences and feelings that goes on in an individual therefore it was complimented by the cognitive dissonance theory. The cognitive dissonance theory which was proposed by Festinger (1957) posits that cognitive dissonance is a psychological phenomenon that emerges when people’s behavior is in conflict with their attitudes or beliefs. One of the typical responses to such discomfort is that people increasingly start believing what they say. For instance, the more often people express statements that are more radical than their actual opinions, the more they will start believing the accurateness of those statements. Maskaliunaite (2015) holds that people can respond to cognitive dissonance by over-justification. The more radicals have invested in the radicalization process, for instance because they broke relationships with family members to gain membership of a radical group, the more they will believe that membership was indeed worth sacrificing family ties for. The author further notes that due to cognitive dissonance, radicalized people will become even more committed to their radical views or network. This theory is important as it plays a role in the emergence of radicalization and explains the cognitive processes in an individual when radicalized.

Conceptual Framework

This conceptual framework exhibits a diagrammatic representation of relationship between the variables.




Figure 1: Relationship between independent, dependent and intervening variables of the study

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study adopted a mixed methods research design, integrating both quantitative and qualitative approaches to provide a comprehensive understanding of vulnerability to radicalization among university students. Conducted in two purposively selected public universities in Kenya, the study targeted third-year students, whose mean age of 20 aligns with Erikson's fifth psychosocial development stage, where identity formation or role confusion occurs, increasing vulnerability to radicalization. Data collection involved questionnaires for students and student counselors, and focus group discussions for peer counselors. The instruments' validity was reviewed by experts from relevant university faculties. The sample size was determined using Yamane's formula, with proportionate stratified sampling ensuring balanced representation. Data were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics, with

chi-square tests identifying significant influences on vulnerability, supported by SPSS version 23.0 and QSR NVivo 12.

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

University Students' Perception on the Influence of Social Economic Status on Vulnerability to Radicalization.

The objective of the study sought to test the following hypothesis.

Ho1: *There is no statistically significant association between university students' perception on the influence of social economic status and vulnerability to radicalization.*

A Chi-square test of independence was conducted with data from 329 students to examine the association between university students' perception of family socioeconomic status and vulnerability to radicalization, focusing on reasons to justify extremist ideologies. The hypothesis tested whether there was a statistically significant association between these perceptions and vulnerability to radicalization, with implications for counseling. Data were gathered using questionnaires, focus group discussions, and interview schedules. Cramer's V was also applied to measure the strength of association between the variables. The test aimed to determine the statistical significance of this relationship and its implications for targeted counseling interventions.

Table 1: Cross tabulation between Annual Income and Vulnerability to Radicalization

		Family annual income * Perception of students on the reasons to justify extremist ideologies Cross tabulation						
		Perception of students on the reasons to justify extremist ideologies					Total	
		Disagree strongly	Disagree	Indifferent	Agree	Strongly agree		
		DS	D	I	A	SA		
Family annual income	Below Ksh. 10,000	Count	0	2	14	20	15	51
		Expected Count	1.1	7.0	7.0	19.8	16.1	51.0
		% of Total	0.0%	0.6%	4.3%	6.1%	4.6%	15.5%
	Ksh.10,000 - Ksh. 30,000	Count	0	6	3	18	13	40
		Expected Count	.9	5.5	5.5	15.6	12.6	40.0
	% of Total	0.0%	1.8%	0.9%	5.5%	4.0%	12.2%	
	Ksh. 30,001 - Ksh. 50,000	Count	1	1	8	40	42	92
		Expected Count	2.0	12.6	12.6	35.8	29.1	92.0
		% of Total	0.3%	0.3%	2.4%	12.2%	12.8%	28.0%
	Ksh. 50,001 - Ksh. 100,000	Count	1	12	7	32	22	74
		Expected Count	1.6	10.1	10.1	28.8	23.4	74.0
		% of Total	0.3%	3.6%	2.1%	9.7%	6.7%	22.5%
	Above Ksh.100,000	Count	5	24	13	18	12	72
		Expected Count	1.5	9.8	9.8	28.0	22.8	72.0
		% of Total	1.5%	7.3%	4.0%	5.5%	3.6%	21.9%
Total		Count	7	45	45	128	104	329
		Expected Count	7.0	45.0	45.0	128.0	104.0	329.0
		% of Total	2.1%	13.7%	13.7%	38.9%	31.6%	100.0%

The results of cross tabulation Table 1 in respect to students who agreed or strongly agreed with the reasons to justify extremist ideologist were from family income bracket Ksh. 30,001 - Ksh. 50,000 (25.0%) followed by from Ksh. 50,001 - Ksh. 100,000 at 16.4%. Family income bracket of above Ksh. 100,000 had the lowest 9.1% of students. Income brackets of Ksh. 10,000 - Ksh. 30,000 and below Ksh. 10,000 had 9.5% and 10.7% respectively. Conversely, the percentage of the students who either disagreed or strongly

disagreed with the reasons to justify extremist ideologies were as follows: below Ksh. 10,000 (0.6%), Ksh. 10,000 - Ksh. 30,000 (1.8%), Ksh. 30,001 - Ksh. 50,000 (0.6%), Ksh. 50,001 - Ksh. 100,000 (3.9%) and above Ksh. 100,000 (3.2%).

Table 2: Chi-square Statistics on Cross Tabulation between Annual Income and Vulnerability to Radicalization

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	73.054 ^a	16	.000
Likelihood Ratio	74.836	16	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	20.910	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	329		

Table 3: Measures of Strength of Effect on Cross Tabulation between Annual Income and Vulnerability to Radicalization.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.471	.000
	Cramer's V	.236	.000
N of Valid Cases		329	

The Pearson Chi-Square results ($\chi^2 (16) = 74.836, p < 0.05$) revealed a significant association between family annual income and students' perceptions of vulnerability to radicalization concerning justifications for extremist ideologies. Cramer's V = 0.471 at an approximate significance of 0.000 indicated a strong effect of association, leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis. Students from lower-income families (earning between Ksh 10,000 and Ksh 50,000) were more likely to agree with justifications for extremist ideologies, while those from higher socioeconomic levels were less likely to do so. However, a notable portion of students across all income levels disapproved of such ideologies, highlighting the need for further research to understand the underlying causes and develop effective countermeasures against radicalization.

The findings align with studies like Cachalia et al. (2016), which emphasize that economic and developmental factors contribute to youth radicalization, though not universally.

Similarly, BIPSS (2022) identifies unemployment, family instability, and financial incentives as significant contributors. Silke (2008) and Zych and Nasaescu (2022) also found links between low socioeconomic status and radicalization, with higher family income and smaller family size reducing vulnerability. Conversely, the results contradict studies such as Koomen and van der Pligt (2016), which argue against poverty as a direct cause of radicalization, and Kavanagh (2011), whose analysis of Hezbollah fighters showed no significant link between poverty and radical group membership. These contrasting perspectives suggest the role of socioeconomic factors varies depending on context and the nature of radicalization phenomena.

The findings also do not agree with those of Glazzard *et al.* (2015) on the role of economic factors in addressing the drivers of radicalization. The authors posit that poverty should not be claimed as automatically contributing to vulnerability to radicalization. Income, poverty, deprivation and underemployment are not sufficient explanations for violent extremism. However, the authors indicate that these factors can contribute to other factors, particularly grievances, and may therefore help to create an environment conducive to violent extremist groups.

While focusing on family financial support it emerged from the interviews and focus group discussions that the level of financial support influences radicalization together with other factors.

One of the key informants asserted that;

“Poverty and lack of principles can push students to connect with people who offer financial aid to them which sometimes is the incentive to join radical groups to get rich quick. However, some students are wise and develop resilience because of poverty at home and end up getting justified ways of working to earn money. The universities also provide work-study opportunities and bursaries for needy students so that radical groups and peers don’t influence them”

In a survey that was done by The Horn Institute and Centre for Sustainable Conflict Resolution (CSCR) (2017) on the Nature, drivers and perceptions of Muslim women and girls toward violent extremism (VE) in Kenya that focused on Muslim women and girls in the Violent Extremist hot-spot areas of Mombasa, Kilifi, Lamu and Kwale at the coast; Mandera, Wajir and Garissa in north eastern; and Isiolo in eastern Kenya. The findings compare with the study finding which reveal that poverty and unemployment are a major

catalyst of other pull and push factors on vulnerability to extremism. Poverty and unemployment were rated the highest risk factors by about 13% of respondents. Less than 5% of the respondents scored it as a low risk factor. These youths do not join VE Organizations because of poverty but because they seek to define themselves (attention and recognition) and VE provides them that opportunity. From the survey, it was apparent that the women from poor backgrounds were more aware and cognizant of the risks of Violent Extremism. This is contrary to the study finding that there is an association between social economic factors and vulnerability to radicalization.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The study established a strong and significant association between family annual income and university students' perception of vulnerability to radicalization in Kenya, with family income having the strongest influence among other factors such as parenting styles and types. The Pearson Chi-Square results ($\chi^2 (16) = 74.836, p < 0.05$) and Cramér's V = 0.471 ($p = 0.000$) highlighted the significant relationship between low, middle, and high family income levels and students' justification of extremist ideologies. Additional factors contributing to vulnerability, as identified by student counselors, included curiosity about extremist experiences (16.7%), drug abuse (8.3%), and the pursuit of quick wealth (8.3%). Peer counselors emphasized that guidance and counseling in universities can address these push factors, provide alternative ways for students to meet financial needs, and mitigate the root causes of radicalization. These findings underscore the importance of targeted counseling interventions to reduce students' susceptibility to extremist ideologies.

CONCLUSION

The study concludes that there is a significant association between family socioeconomic status—specifically low, middle, and high family annual income levels—and students' perception of vulnerability to radicalization in Kenyan universities. Counselors should proactively identify vulnerable students and provide targeted counseling and therapy sessions. Additionally, there is a need to develop and implement effective intervention and sensitization programs to raise awareness among students about factors contributing to radicalization. Enhancing the effectiveness and utilization of counseling services is critical in preventing radicalization. Furthermore, efforts to improve the livelihoods of at-risk groups, particularly university students, by equipping them with better skills, education, and access to employment opportunities, are essential in countering radicalization.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Research on the subject of students' vulnerability to radicalization and implications for counselling can be extended to private universities and other universities in East Africa and Africa. Multiple studies can help in identifying similarities and differences in the region. Studies can also be carried out on other factors that influence vulnerability to radicalization.

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